Yes, we support the transition of the NTIA’s stewardship role over the IANA Functions. The transition of NTIA stewardship is an important step in the evolution and maturation of the multi-stakeholder model. Notwithstanding, we think it is imperative that the transition be done right. This includes development of a sound transition plan that meets the needs of the customers of the IANA function; addressing contingencies, concerns, and potential issues related to the transition through stress testing; and ensuring that the requisite “Workstream 1” accountability mechanisms identified by the CCWG Accountability are in place prior to the transition.
In my view, both ICANN and the multistakeholder model are mature enough to step in and take the responsibility and the service ( role ) delivered by NTIA.
The multistakeholder community has grown engough in maturity to supervise indirectly the overall NTIA functions, in place of one governement in particular
The current control of USG bears risks to the long term coherence of the Internet - and wastes a lot of resources as it is discussed over and over again. Operationally the NTIA oversight is not harmful, and there are certainly possible scenarios that are worse.
I think, it is time that the NTIA hand over its stewardship to other hands
IANA stewardship should be neutral to any government.
IANA should be independent of any government.
Would relieve the pressure form certain countries looking for multilateral solutions and nothing a transition now would be seen as a failure of the multistakeholder model
It is important that IANA will be a neutral organization
It is natural development of global internet
I do not see the need for a rush
We are generally comfortable with ICANN continuing to serve as both a convener for the policy making processes for the GNSO and CCNSO and as the IANA operator. We note the key distinction that ICANN is not in its own right the policymaker for ccTLD and gTLDs, but rather facilitates policy development through the applicable multi-stakeholder process. The acceptability of ICANN continuing both of these roles is not condition-free. It depends upon continued insulation of the IANA functions from the ICANN policy process and development and implementation of a sound transition proposal by the CWG IANA and an accountability framework by the CCWG-Accountability. These outputs must meet the needs of the customers of the IANA functions in terms of operational performance and transparency and provide for overall organizational accountability, respectively. We believe that some external oversight over the performance of the IANA functions is still desirable, but that this oversight could take a variety of forms. We strongly support the formation of a Customer Standing Committee to regularly review the performance of the IANA Functions against established service levels and the continuation of existing reporting and transparency requirements to facilitate third party monitoring of this nature.
Mature management requires acceptance of external oversight; this is very important function which supports growth and development.
sutrctural or operational separation is necessary to insure that policy making is not influenced by execution contingency. Furthermore, policy making as well as operations (execution) has to be oversighted
We could live with it, altough we'd prefer to have some oversight. This oversight could be part of the ICANN arena but would have to be outside of the control of the ICANN board.
for a ccTLD ICANN is not the police making organisation, therefore I think the operational part of IANA is well located within ICANN, but there should be an external oversight body or organisation
Yes, if both policy-making and IANA operation have enough accountability to the community and the community has enough power to redress the unfavorable activities of ICANN.
As long as there is a multistakeholder oversight and a possibility of later separability
Only if ICANN accountability is improved = there is no need for oversight. Yes there is already a separation between policy making part for TLDs and IANA operations but can be improved too. e.g. IANA can be operated as a sister or a subsidiary company of ICANN but some process separation should be in place.
We didn't experience any problem with ICANN and IANA until now.
As long as ICANN is in both roles under the oversight of the multistakeholder community as is what the CCWG currently strives for
I am sure that ICANN is able to manage the accountability with the communities' support
One criterion described by the NTIA was that the proposal must meet the needs of the customers of the IANA functions, which for the naming functions refers to ccTLD and gTLD registry operators. Registries’ businesses are uniquely dependent on the continued operational performance of the IANA naming functions. As such, we believe that any proposal must be deemed acceptable by ccTLD and gTLD registry operators.
The registries are key clients of IANA and focus mainly on technical aspects including service level. The scope of transition proposal is much wider.
Regsitries are not the primary customers of all IANA functions. They are essential customers of the naming function. They have to be listened carefully, and yet they are not the most important stakeholders as stakeholders has to be taken on equal footing.
I don't agree that registries are more important. They are only more complicated.
the IANA part is very important for all ccTLD´s and therefore there voice should be heart
Yes, especially for the technical aspects of the IANA functions.
But only in relation to the technical performance
But the end of the day it is negotiation and coming to a mutually acceptable agreement with other customers of IANA.
Registries should verify the acceptability of the transition proposal.
There is a direct dependency with regard to the IANA services. So proposals should only be acceptable and presented to the NTIA if these proposals have the support of the registries. This is however already part of the NTIA criteria, so should not be an issue.
We are the organizations that needs the IANA's services
We believe that functional separation should, at minimum, encompass the following: ● Providing a stable, transparent, and predictable revenue stream for IANA operations that would continue regardless of decisions made as a part of ICANN’s budgeting process (e.g. by apportioning a set percentage of the fees that ICANN receives from registry operators or from the other streams to IANA operations); ● Operating IANA in accordance with processes, service levels, and reporting requirements, and transparency procedures, etc. that are known to its customers and not subject to unilateral change by ICANN; ● Insulating IANA operations from the ICANN policy process by ensuring that groups or interests cannot use IANA to advance a policy goal; and ● Designating distinct ICANN staff to manage IANA operations and the ICANN policy processes.
- Presence of SLA's: - Mechanisms to redress
We have dedicated resources, managemt system, metrics, procedures and processes exclusively assigned to IANA.
internal separation between ICANN and IANA in the context where ICANN is the IANA operator
Mainly dedicated staff, up to management level. Fine grained, auditable reporting on actions. Clearly defined processes. However, care should be taken that rules are not overly restrictive, and do not prevent IANA knowledge and experience to reach the other ICANN staff.
that different people do the day-to-day job and the police making body for IANA is not ICANN or the ICANN board
(This question can't be answerd by "Yes" or "No") To separate the framework of policy-making and that of operation.
Means that IANA have separate personel like own legal advice, own technicians, own leadership team and their own budget.
As stated in the previous question, IANA can be operated as a sister or a subsidiary company of ICANN but some process separation should be in place.
We'd like IANA to be a part of ICANN.
It seems logical that the IANA services are run by a separate part of ICANN as it is currently organised. We do not see any need for further separation.
Internal separation is fine, but then ICANN/IANA still needs some form of oversight
We believe that IANA operations are generally well separated from interference by the ICANN policy process, but that separation could be further improved. Examples of how separation could be improved include providing transparency into the budget of the IANA department versus that of ICANN as a whole and by providing a stable and segmented revenue stream for IANA operations.
From my perspective, the mentioned separtion works, however we have never tested any bad scenarious ( bad things never happened, at least for the last 2 and half years; from the moment I joined the ccTLD), however I would liek point out that it doeas not mean that the model with separation requirement is not needed.
I do not know enough about it to give an informed answer.
No better functional separation is needed
But the transition is an opportunity for improving those current arrangements.
IANA is quite independent from ICANN under current arrangements.
works fine now, so why change anything
I think that is important to let the relevant communities the opportunity to make the right decisions
We feel that separability of the IANA functions from ICANN should be possible in limited circumstances, such as operational incompetence, and provided that a clear and transparent escalation process is followed and fails to address the issue under consideration. We believe that a decision to appoint a new operator for the IANA naming functions would have to be approved by registry operators as the primary customers of that function.
Quite importnat, as it is a part of management system; the most of the listed aspects are related to services and overall performance. This is different agenda. .
I would give a great importance to the "ability" to seprate IANA from ICANN. Because if this ability would not exist, it would be a stepback from the current situation were the US governement theoretically can remove the IANA function from ICANN.
Medium to low. The most important part is the actual service, and that should receive all the support and resources required to perform next to perfection. Accountability and auditability would be closely related to that. Easy separability is only useful in case of ICANN's failure, and as a menace.
(This question can't be answerd by "Yes" or "No") Security and stability of the DNS and its operational arrangement are the most important regardless of where IANA function resides.
Security and stability are the most important
We don't think that they should be separated.
Very limited to none. Oversight over the IANA function should be arranged by changes to ICANN's accountability. If the community obtains through the CCWG process the necessary mechanisms that will give them oversight over the board there will no longer be any necessity for a separability mechanism as the community that than oversees ICANN is exactly the same community that would decide on separation.
It is not the top priority, but it is important. There should be a mechanism to continue IANA function in case ICANN fails for any reason
I do not understand the yes/no option. To me a possible separation of IANA from ICANN is very important
high logical importance
Yes, we believe that it would be valuable to provide these costs as well as a breakout across the three categories of functions.
Yes, it would help us in understandnig the value and the cost figures; the performance indicators and targets ( service levels); the excellence of service and security and stability; and the overall risk of operations including financial risk, if it comes.
In any case, it is important. Even in the case there would be no posibility for separation.
Not sure if I understood the question correctly. As long as IANA is part of ICANN (functionally separated or not), ICANN should provide the funds via its budget. If IANA is completely outside ICANN, ICANN should not be required to contribute - in that case the IANA customers should be able to provide the funds, possibly by reducing ICANN contributions.
If IANA's budget is defined by the community, the result of the financial audit is the most important information for the community.
If IANA functions will be separated from ICANN then IANA auditor (oversight body) should care about the cost.
I could not answer this question as it is not clear what 'overhead costs' in this specific question means. In my perspective it should be clear what the costs of the IANA services are.
Yes it is important, having in mind self-growth of ICANN functions
Yes, we believe that it would be valuable to provide these costs as well as a breakout across the three categories of functions.
Based on the details I have, I would not support the importance of the mentioned separation
accountability, transparency, but also the need to always improve.
because there is a need for a clear cost calculation for the founding and what part is for ccTLD´s (and also gTLD´s)
Registries should pay for the name functions. RIRs should pay address and protocol functions.
It seems that address and protocol function costs are not that much of an issue
To the extent possible contingencies associated with the ability to move the IANA functions should be considered and addressed within the stress tests for the IANA transition.
I see some risk of delay when making the decision and deployment of the new project. I belive that ICANN policy is/ will be subject of the internet community consensus and will work for public good.
There would be impacts, but I don't see how they would be unforseen. Any operator should have to implement the policy. inside or outside Icann, and if ICANN still have this policy role, ICANN would have the ability to demand the implementation in any circumstance to the IANA operator.
ICANN would provide input to IANA, just like the IETF or NROs. Generally speaking it should not be IANA's role to comment on that input. This said, technical comments from the IANA operator should be valuable input during any policy process.
(Cannot fully understand the question.)
But this can be dealt with.IANA should only be separated from ICANN in extreme misconduct.
We do not consider another operator for the IANA functions.
As soon as you select a new operator it is needed that the roles and authorities of all involved becomes crisp clear, defined and well documented, which it clearly currently is not. (the same question however currently applies to the rol of the RZM.)
This is a decision that must be taken by gNSO and ccNSO communitues
there will be few. OK ICANN runs new gTLD process. Operator accepts only the results and not part of it
We believe that the CWG should give serious consideration to recommendations that simplify or streamline the proposals currently under discussion. We believe that the interests and needs of ccTLD and gTLD registries are insufficiently represented in the proposals to date as the direct customers of the IANA naming function and we would welcome proposals that empower these communities in IANA’s oversight.
Anything that leads to a solution preserving stability, security,and resiliency and is simple.
The proposal should be build on the existing assests; on what we already gathered. It's a lot. The differences have to be understood and negoatiated. First of all the objective of low risk should be applied. The IANA in this proposal should be housed by ICANN and separated accordingly ( an independent department). ICANN accountability should be analysed and possible extenstion to be discussed and implemented to meet the new management model.
I have no idea.
As stated before we see enhancing ICANN's accountability as the solution for the IANA oversight transition and even think that it would be good to merge the CWG and CCWG and stop working on the separability driven CWG solutions (including the new proposal by Avri Doria c.s.).
There must be, but I cannot submit one ;)
there is one: the simple one. limit the IANA operator functionality and selection to the technical community.